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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLARENCE M. STAMP, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
I j Case No. 8463 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
(Numbers in parentheses refer to pages of the 
record. The parties will be referred to here as they ap-
peared in the trial court.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant appeals from a judgment in the amount of 
$10,000.00, rendered in favor of plaintiff in an action 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 
The sole ground of appeal is excessive damages. 
Defendant contends the damages were so excessive that 
they appear to have been given under the influence of 
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passion or prejudice, or in the 'alternative they were so 
excessive that this Court should require a remittitur or 
new trial. 
The Statement of Facts presented by defendant on 
liability fairly reflects the evidence introduced. No ques-
tion is here raised on liability and we do not propose to 
devote any time or space to that subject. We must as-
sume that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the 
jury's findings that defendant was responsible to plain-
tiff for any damage he suffered as a result of its negli-
gence. 
\Ve do not believe that the Statement of Facts fairly 
reflects the testimony on the question of damages. The 
defendant seeks to belittle plaintiff's evidence on damage 
and does not give due regard to the mental pain and 
suffering which :\Ir. Stamp endured as a result of his in-
juries. A good example of defendants bias in reviewing 
the evidence is found on Page 3 of ~lppellant's Brief 
wherein it states : 
"The doctor removed the bandage from his 
left eye and asked him to read a chart, and he 
claims he couldn't see the chart with his left eye." 
Plaintiff testified he couldn't see the chart. This 
is l'YidPnet\ in the case and the condition of his eye at that 
tiine. It isn't 1nerely rlailned, it n1ust be considered here 
as a fact established. 
\ V e wi II treat the testimony under Point I of this 
BriPf. 
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STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE 
JURY WAS NOT EXCESSIVE AND DOES NOT APPEAR 
"~ \: TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
PASSION OR PREJUDICE. 
,,r 
,, . 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION 
IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE VERDICT 
OF THE JURY WAS EXCESSIVE DUE TO THE INFLUENCE 
OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION 
IN FAILING TO ORDER PLAINTIFF TO MAKE A RE-
MITTITUR. 
ARGU~IENT 
POINT I 
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE 
JURY WAS NOT EX·CESSIVE AND DOES NOT APPEAR 
TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
PASSION OR PREJUDICE. 
The elements of damage to which plaintiff was en-
titled were the loss of wages; mental pain .and suffering, 
both past and future; physical pain and suffering, both 
past and future; and loss of bodily function, both past 
and future. 
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The loss of wages in this case was not great, being 
between $200.00 and $300.00. The bulk of the damages 
suffered were the mental pain and suffering which plain-
tiff endured and that he may endure in the future and 
also his physical pain. For a very good statement of 
the elements of mental pain and suffering see Merrill v. 
Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co., 158 Cal. 499, 508, 111 
Pac. 534, 538. 
To most human beings sight is one of the greatest 
blessings which has been afforded them to enjoy during 
their lifetime. To take sight away from a person elimi-
nates a goodly portion of his life and his ability to enjoy 
life. To contemplate going through life without sight 
would cause a feeling of horror and it certainly caused 
:Jf r. Stan1p an exceptionally large amount of mental pain 
and suffering. It is easy to look back from our present 
vantage point and say but a few hours were spent by 
plaintiff when he felt that horror. However, those hours 
as :J[ r. Stan1p was going through them were hours com-
po~Pd of 1ninutes and seconds. \\T e should relive that 
time with plaintiff. "\Ye do not believe that defendant 
has properly set forth the experience of plaintiff result-
ing fr01n these injuries. 
Plaintiff dropped the fusee into the flagging kit and 
t hPn' wa~ an explosion. Plaintiff testified: 
"\ Ylwn this explosion occurred right at the 
time, l just did not know exactly what had hap-
JH'JH'd, hut I couldn't see. So, I staggered back !o 
whert> tlw lwneh was and sat down-half way la1d 
dovm." (~8) 
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This occurred about 10:00 A.M. (20) 
Plaintiff further testified: 
"The conductor, naturally, came right down, 
because I had a handkerchief and was trying to 
wipe my eyes out, and I started to remove pieces 
of paper, I presume. There were quite large 
pieces, and he asked me immediately what hap-
pened, and at the time, of course, I was so upset 
I didn't know, only there had been an explosion. 
He said, 'Are you-your handerchief-take your 
hand down so I can see your face,' .and I did, and 
he said, 'You look like hell,' and I put the hand-
kerchief to my face again, and he was as worried 
as I was. He said, 'I'll go over the top of the train 
and get a track so they can take us in the yard.' 
The reason for that was-ordinarily we will some-
times set at that switch for as high as an hour or 
an hour and thirty minutes, and he didn't want 
me out there that long. He started over the top. 
He got up two cars, I suppose, .and he hadn't been 
gone a minute or two, and the train started to 
move, and he came back in the caboose. He said, 
'Well, we are going in now.' Of course, all of 
this time I was still digging at my eyes, and he 
asked me if I could see, and I said, 'No, I can't 
see,' and then there wasn't much either one of us 
could say. The train stopped again, I remember, 
and he said again, 'I am going over the top.' 
Before he could get any distance they started 
again and they did take us in the yard." (28,29) 
The conductor, George E. Fuller, described plain-
tiff's face as follows: 
"Q. Could you describe it for us, please~ 
A. Well, his face resembled a man that would be 
perspiring blood. 
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Q. And, that was all over his face~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you observe his eyes~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Could you describe those for us, please~ 
1\.. I could see particles in his eyes and blood 
coming from his eyes. 
Q. When you examined him there in the caboose, 
did he appear to be in pain~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And was that true all the time you were with 
him~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You were with him for how long a period of 
time? 
A. Oh, I don't recall. I expect probably an hour. 
Q. Did you accompany him as he went to the 
various places to the depot, and up to the 
doctor's office~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he require help? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did it look likely that he could see 1 
A. No, sir." (71) 
Plaintiff also experienced trouble "ith his ears. He 
t <'~t i t'i<>d <'Oncerning hi~ ears ilnn1ediately after the explo-
sion: 
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"Q. What about your ears at this time. What 
effect did it have on your ears~ 
A. My left ear was ringing from this explosion. 
It caught me on the left side. I couldn't hear 
out of my left ear at all. There was nothing· 
but a roaring noise." (29) 
After the conductor entered the caboose to help 
plaintiff dismount, plaintiff described his condition as 
follows: 
"Q. Could you see at this time¥ 
A. No, sir, he took me off the caboose-! know 
they did say, 'We will take him up on the 
switch engine, but we will have to carry him 
all that distance to the depot, which is a con-
siderable distance.' They lead me to the 
'carry-all', and placed me on it and went with 
me, and the girl that drives the 'carry-all' for 
the company drove directly to the doctor's 
office. * * * 
Q. Could you see in the doctor's office¥ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Go ahead and tell us-
A. And, there was some type of table they laid 
me down on and I do know there were two 
men in the office with me that happened to 
be railroad officials. They started asking me 
at that time what happened. I was in no 
condition to tell anyone what had happened 
after all." ( 30) 
Concerning the examination and treatment of the 
first doctor to examine him at Green River, plaintiff 
testified: 
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"A. This first doctor, I know, raised my eye lid. 
I could feel that, and then he called the other 
doctor. I heard the other doctor ask for a 
magnifying glass and then I felt him raise 
one eye lid and he said, 'That is all. He will 
have to go to a specialist. I won't fool with 
his eyes five minutes.' 
Q. Tell us whether or not you were worried at 
this time in connection with your eyes. 
A. I certainly \vas. At that particular time, 
which was a period there for approximately 
thirty-forty-five minutes, I was in consider-
able pain. I had really no time to worry, ex-
cept to know that I was in a helpless condi-
tion. I had to have someone lead me." (31) 
Plaintiff was thereafter "led" to the Union Pacific 
Club and waited there until the train left Green River for 
Cheyenne (31). At approximately 12:30 P.1I. plaintiff 
was put on the train destined for Cheyenne. The doctor 
had prescribed drops to be placed in his eyes to kill the 
pain .and the Assistant Superintendent placed these drops 
in his eyes eYery hour (39). Concerning the condition of 
his PYP~. so far as Yision was concerned, between Green 
BiYPr and Rawlins he testified: 
''Q. During this tune, could you see' 
A. Ont of 1ny right eye on the train I could dis-
tinguish the light of a match which was by 
holding it up before my eye as though you 
wPre to light a cigarette; that is all. 
Q. 'Yhat about your left eye Y 
A. Nothing.'' (39) 
Plaintiff's wife entrained with hin1 at Rawlins and 
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accompanied him to Cheyenne. She continued to give him 
the medication (39,40). 
He arrived in Cheyenne at 6 :00 P.M. and the only 
pain he was suffering was a burning sensation in the 
corner of his left eye. He still couldn't hear out of his left 
ear. He entered the :Memorial Hospital at 6 :20 P.M. and 
s.aw Dr. Stump, an eye specialist ( 40). About the treat-
ment administered to him at that time, he testified: 
"Q. Tell us what treatment he administered to 
you~ 
A. Well, he must have arrived at the hospital 
about 6 :45, and he removed particles from my 
eye, but, of course, I couldn't see what he was 
doing, but he did remove a great number of 
particles from my eye at this time." ( 40) 
Regarding his worries in the hospital, plaintiff tes:ti-
fied: 
"Q. Were you thinking, or did you worry at all 
about your eyes at this time~ 
A. I certainly did, yes, sir. 
Q. Tell us about that worry. 
A. Well, it's not a pleasant sensation to know 
you can't see, and knowing whether you will 
never be able to see again. 
Q. Were you worried about that~ 
A. I certainly was." ( 41) 
He remained in the hospital from November 6th 
until his discharge on the lOth. He testified that the ban-
dages on his eyes were soaking wet and the nurse couhl 
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not change them. He was uncomfortable the Saturday 
night of his arrival because of the bandages and both 
eyes were watering and running free. On Monday morn-
ing Dr. Stump came to the hospital and bandaged his 
right eye and removed more particles ( 41). Plaintiff 
then testified: 
"Q. Could you see out of that at that time~ 
A. I could see light, yes, sir, out of my right eye 
at that time, and for that reason he left the, 
patch off my right eye. I could see to get' 
around the hospital, but left the patch on the 
left eye. 
Q. Tell us what vision you actually had Y Could 
you distinguish objects and so on 7 
A. Out of my right eye I could distinguish ob-
jects enough to find my way around the hos-
pital when I wanted to get up to go to the 
bathroom." ( -±1,-!2) 
On Tuesday Inorning plaintiff was taken to the doc-
tor's office. SeYeral particles in his eyes were very hard 
to re1nove. One in particular gaYe the doctor a lot of 
diffienlty ( -!::2). He testified concerning his sight at that 
tilne: 
.. A. • • • Then is when he uncovered my left 
PYe and asked 1ne to read a chart on the wall 
tltat the Pye specialist used, but at that time 
I eouldn 't even see the chart with my left eye. 
Q. .And, tell us how that made you feel Y 
.A. 'rt'll, I was to send my wife home that day. 
~lw eouldn't staY awaY from the children any 
longer, and being left 8lone-and at that time 
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she said she was going to find a job, since 
I wasn't going to be able to work again." ( 42) 
On this occasion his left eye was still bandaged. On 
the morning of the lOth, Dr. Stump came to the hospital 
and asked plaintiff to go to his office. At the office the 
doctor removed more particles and told him he could go 
home for a week. Plaintiff had to return to the hospital 
to check out (43). Concerning his mental condition .at 
that time he testified: 
"Q. Were you still worried about your eyes at 
that time? 
A. I was worried considerably, yes, sir." ( 43) 
When he left on this occasion the doctor removed the 
bandage from his left eye but advised him to wear dark 
glasses to protect his eyes from the sun, which plaintiff 
did ( 43,44). About his vision at that time, plaintiff 
stated: 
"Q. Tell us about your vision at this time. 
A. \Veil, my right eye seemed at that particular 
time so that I could get around, and it didn't 
seem to bother me at all. However, my left 
eye gave me considerable concern. I kept my 
wife quite bu~y with setting up, in particular, 
a Post Toashes box on the table so I could 
.attempt to read it to see if my eyes were gain-
ing or losing strength. I made no effort what-
soever to read, and due to the fact I don't 
think I could have, I didn't want to strain my 
eyes. I wanted them to be in first-class con-
dition." ( 44) 
While at home this first week, plaintiff's eyes were 
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continually draining and he had to keep changing pads. 
He had to administer drops to his eyes. He returned to 
Cheyenne on November 17th ( 44). On this occasion the 
doctor released him to go to work. Concerning the treat-
ment at this time, he testified: 
"A. He wanted to take a look at one more particle 
in my eye before I went home to see if it was 
necessary to remove it. He spent possibly 
as much as five minutes and did remove one 
particle, or attempt to, I don't know that he 
did out of my right eye." ( 45) 
At the time plaintiff left the doctor's office, he wore 
dark glasses and he was not capable of driving his auto-
mobile. Concerning his vision at that time, he testified: 
"Q. 'Vhat can you tell us about your vision at 
that time! 
A. l\I' vision seemed to be all right as far as dis-
~ce was concerned, but when it came to 
reading, the words seemed to run together." 
(45) 
~ i nee the explosion, plaintiff has worn dark glasses 
to keep the sun fr01n his eyes. He has experienced head-
aehP~ :-;inee that time ( 41). He testified that he worried 
about his eyes : 
"Q. During the period of time since you started 
to work, han_~ you had any worries about your 
eyP sightY 
A. I haYe worried about it constantly, yes, sir. 
Q. And, have you had any experience with for-
('ign bodies cOining out of your eyes! 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. Yes, sir. On-
Q. Tell us those. 
13 
A. New Years Day we were invited to watch tele-
vision. I looked forward to it. I couldn't, I 
had to leave, and a body was trying to wo.rk 
out of my eye at that time, .and was qu1te 
painful. That night it did come out as my 
wife finally caught it on my eye lid and took 
it out on a handkerchief. It was a crystal-like 
object that reflected the light very sharp, and 
then as late as last Friday, I was in Green 
River and one was working out. ( 47) 
Q. How do they feel~ 
A. Very much as Doctor Palmer described it-
as though you have an object in your eye. 
You can't keep from blinking your eye. Your 
eye runs constantly, which it did all that day. 
However, I seem to be able to put my eye lid 
down and press on it and this object seemed 
to go back in my eye, .and relieve it for pos-
sibly a period of thirty minutes, and then it 
would start again, and when I arrived home 
Friday night from work, I asked my wife if 
she could find it, but she was unable to detect 
it. Saturday morning, as Dr. Palmer de-
scribed it, seemed to have gone. 
Q. Have you experienced that same thing very 
often during this year-this occurrence~ 
A. Quite often, yes, sir. 
Q. And, has that caused you worry~ 
A. It has to a certain extent, yes, sir." ( 48) 
Plaintiff's wife tesii;ified that when she saw plaintiff 
on the train November Gth, his face was flushed and there 
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were cuts and particles of blood on his f.ace. Plaintiff's 
eyes were continually running and he couldn't hold them 
open very long. Both plaintiff and his wife testified that 
prior to the explosion he had not had trouble with his 
eyes or with headaches and he had not worn dark glasses 
to any extent ( 45,4 7,65). 
We submit that the foregoing testin1ony establishes 
that there w.as an unusually large amount of mental pain 
and suffering endured by plaintiff in this case. Plaintiff 
also suffered physical pain. 
Defendant in its brief contends that very early 
within two hours after the explosion plaintiff knew he 
had not lost the sight in his right eye and that ''-ithin 
three days he knew he had not lost the sight of either eye. 
Of course, under well established principle the evidence 
must be viewed most f.avorably to plaintiff. The fore-
going evidence shows that these contentions of defendan~ 
are not well founded. 
That a person could distinguish that a match was 
lighted when held close furnishes no knowledge that he 
had not lost the sight of his eye. The evidence was to the 
effect that he was worried about injuries to his eyes 
right up until the time of trial. There were still particles 
in his eyes as late .as September 23, 1955, the Friday be-
fore the trial ( 48). There is no foundation for saying 
that plaintiff's worries were as short lived as defendant 
contends. 
liJxcessiveness of the verdict is the only foundation 
for defendant's contention that the verdict resulted from 
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passion and prejudice. In Ladder v. Western Pacific R. 
Co., (Utah) 259 P. 2d 589, this Court pointed out: 
"We also do not agree with defendants' con-
tention that the amount of the verdict was so ex-
cessive as to require a holding as a matter of law 
that the jury was actuated by passion and preju-
dice. We recently said that where the 'verdict is 
so excessive as to show that it must have been 
1notivated by prejudice or ill will * * * it should 
be unconditionally set aside.' But we find no 
case where this court has held that as a matter 
of law passion and prejudice were shown merely 
by the excessive amount of the verdict so we have 
not indicated how great an amount or percentage 
of reduction would be required to make such a 
showing but we have approved reductions as high 
as 50 per cent, and required a reduction of 70 per 
cent of punitive damages, or about 63 per cent of 
the total verdict. Here there was no other evi-
dence of passion and prejudice. The trial judge 
evidently concluded that the verdjct was not so 
tainted. In Wheat v. Denver & R.G. W. R.R. Co., 
supra, we stressed that in case of doubt the de-
liberate action of the trial court should be fol-
lowed. I-Iere the reduction was justified but there 
was no other evidence of passion and prejudice." 
This Court then listed the verdicts and percentage 
of reduction and in no case was it found that passion 
and prejudice were present where reductions had been 
as high as 50% on general damages and 70% on punitive 
damages. In the Lodder case the reduction was from 
$25,000.00 to $10,000.00 a reduction of 60% and yet the 
Court held there was no passion or prejudice as matter 
of law. 
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When excessiveness of the verdict was raised in the 
United States Supreme Court, it stated in Affolder v. 
N.Y.C. & St. L. R. Co., 339 U.S. 96, 70 S. Ct. 509, 94 L. 
Ed. 683: 
"We agree * * * that the amount of damages 
awarded * * * is not monstrous in the circum-
st,ances of this case." 
The Federal Courts have held that passion and 
prejudice of the jury will not be inferred from the mere 
excessiveness of the award. Larsen v. Chicago & N. W. R. 
Co., 171 F. 2d 841. 
The same situation exists here as in Pauly v. Mc-
Carthy, 109 Utah 431, 184 P. 2d 123, when this Court 
stated: 
"We can discover nothing in this case, except 
the amount of the verdict, which indicates passion 
or prejudice, and, as we have seen, passion and 
prejudice are not necessarily inferred from an ex-
cessive verdict, 'vithout more. No exception was 
taken to the jury or any member thereof. No con-
duct on the part of the jury, evincing passion 
and prejudice, has been called to our attention. 
The only point of complaint is the size of verdict.'' 
Also in this case there is another event which has 
been considered of great importance by appellate courts. 
The trial court, who saw and heard plaintiff and the 
other witnesses, has placed its stmnp of approval upon 
this verdict. This was pointed out in the Lodder case. 
Supra. This has been considered of importance in this 
jurisdiction since at least 1916 when this Court in Steph-
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ens Ranch & Live Stock Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 48 
Utah 528, 161 Pac. 459, stated: 
"Necessarily upon such a question appellate 
courts must, to a large extent, rely upon the judg-
ment and discretion of the trial court. That court 
is in a much better position to observe and deter-
mine whether a jury was actuated by p.assion or 
prejudice, or by both, in returning a verdict for 
an amount larger than the evidence justifies, or 
whether the jury was merely mistaken with re-
gard to the amount that should have been allow-
ed. The jury may merely have misjudged the evi-
dence, or may have erred in their judgment re-
specting the amount that should be allowed, and 
if such is the case the whole verdict is not tainted, 
and the error may be cured by requiring the 
plaintiff to remit the excess. To ihat effect are 
all of the modern authorities. In Gila Valley, 
G&N Ry. Co. v. Hall, 13 Ariz. 270, 112 Pac. 845, 
what we deem to be the correct rule is stated by 
the Supreme Court of Arizona in the fifth head-
note, thus: 
'Unless it clearly appears from the court 
record that an excessive verdict in a personal· 
injury action resulted from prejudice or pas-
sion rather than an undue liberality exercised 
by the jury in awarding damages, the trial 
court's action in remitting a part of the ver-
dict instead of granting a new trial will not be 
disturbed.' " 
While this Court has expressly reserved to itself the 
power to grant a new trial where the verdict is tainted 
with passion and prejudice, it has many times avowed 
its hesitancy in exercising that power or in any way 
usurping the functions of the trial court or the jury and 
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this Court has never exercised that power. In the Pauly 
c.ase supra, it stated: 
"Since the Jensen case above quoted, it is 
well settled that this court has power to, and will, 
consider assignments of error based on excessive 
verdicts. But, although we have the power to 
order a new trial in case of an excessive verdict, 
it is a power which we have rarely, if ever, exer-
cised. However, in the case of Shep.ard v. Payne, 
supra, we ordered a remission of $2,500 from a 
$10,000 verdict. In that case, the excess was not 
the result of passion or prejudice, but was deter-
minable as a matter of law. 
"Where we can say, as .a matter of law, that 
the verdict was so excessive as to appear to have 
been given under the influence of passion or preju-
dice, and the trial court abused its discretion or 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a 
motion for new trial, we may order the verdict 
set aside and a new trial granted. Jensen v. 
Denver & R.G. R. Co., supra; and other cases 
cited above following that decision. But mere 
excessiveness of a verdict without more, does 
not necessarilY show that the verdict was arrived 
at by passim~ or prejudice. Stephens R.anch & 
Livestock Co. v. Union Pac. R. Co., supra. It is 
true that the verdict might be so grossly excessive 
and disproportionate to the injury that we could 
say from that fact alone that as a matter of law 
the verdict must have been arrived at by passion 
or prejudice. But the farts must be such that the 
excess can be determined as a matter of law, or 
the verdict must be so excessive as to be shocking 
to one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion, 
prejudice, or corruption on the part of the jury. 
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~1:cAfee v .. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., supra; 
Ward v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., supra. This is 
not such a case. 
* * * * 
"The jury is allowed great latitude in assess-
ing damages for personal injuries. Miller v. 
Southern Pac. Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P. 2d 865. The 
present cost of living and the diminishing pur-
chasing power of the dollar may be taken into 
consideration when estimating damages. Coke v. 
Tim by, 57 Utah 53, 192 P. 624; McAfee v. Ogden 
Union Ry. & Depot Co., supra." 
This Court has also laid down the requirement·s 
which will justify the trial court in granting a new trial 
in Jensen v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 
138 Pac. 1185 : 
"Still the jury cannot be permitted to go un-
bridled and unchecked. Hence the Code that a new 
trial on motion of the .aggrieved party may be 
granted by the court below on the ground of 'ex-
cessive damages appearing to have been given un-
der the influence of passion or prejudice.' When-
ever that is made to appear, the court, when its 
action is properly invoked, should require a re-
mission or set the verdict aside and grant a new 
trial. But, before the court is justified to do that, 
it should clearly be made to appear that the jury 
totally mistook or disregarded the rules of law 
by which the damages were to be regulated, or 
wholly misconceived or disregarded all the evi-
dence, and by so doing committed gross and palp-
able error by rendering a verdict so enormous 
or outr.ageous or unjust as to be attributable to. 
neither the charge nor the evidence, but only to 
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passion or prejudice. Whether a new trial should 
or should not be granted on this ground, of neces-
sity, must largely rest within the sound discretion 
of the trial court." 
For two excellent statements of the principles which 
should govern the trial court in exercising its discretion 
see Jones v. Atlantic Refining Co., 55 F. Supp. 17 and 
Werthan Bag Corporation v. Agneu·, 202 F. 2d 119. 
The Supreme Court can then only review the ruling 
of the trial court on the basis that the trial court has 
abused its discretion. This, again, is clearly pointed out 
in the Jensen case where it is stated: 
"Still that court, in such particular, is not 
supreme or beyond reach. Its action may never-
theless be inquired into and reviewed on an al-
leged .abuse of discretion, or a capricious or arbi-
trary exercise of power in such respect. Such a 
review is not a review of a question of fact, but 
of law. A ruling granting or refusing a motion 
for a new trial is certainly reviewable when the 
proceedings with respect to it are properly pre-
served and presented. That has not been ques-
tioned. Of course the ruling will not be disturbed 
on evidence in conflict or on n1atters involving 
discretion. Yet our power to correct a plain abuse 
of discretion or undo a Inere capricious or arbi-
tranT exercise of power cannot be doubted." 
Neither this Court nor the trial court should set its 
opinion against the opinion of the jury which is the trib-
unal charged with the responsibility of returning 
a verdict. To do so is to usurp its function. This is 
pointed out in the Jensen case : 
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"Neither is either party on that question en-
titled to the judgment of the court below in a case 
of tort tried to a jury. Both parties, as to that, 
are entitled to the unprejudiced judgment of the 
jury. That is exclusively within their province. 
Their power and discretion, when properly exer-
cised and when they have been properly directed 
as to the measure of damages and the mode of as-
sessing it, n1ay not be interfered with merely be-
cause the court above or below may think the 
amount rendered is too large, or even may think 
it appears to be larger than the evidence appar-
ently or fairly justifies. A court, vacating a ver-
dict and granting a new trial by merely setting up 
his opinion or judgment against that of the jury, 
but usurps judicial power and prostitutes the 
constitutional trial by jury." 
Defendant places great reliance upon Duffy v. Union 
Pacific R. Co., 118 Utah 82, 219 P. 2d 1080. It refers 
to the major injury and excruciating pain suffered by 
Duffy. Defendant is the same here .as there and in its 
brief there it characterized Duffy's injuries as follows: 
"We respectfully submit that if any reason-
able person were asked to compare this ordeal 
with the normal affairs which a common person 
sustains in his every day life he could not but con-
clude that the pain and suffering so expressively 
stated by Mr. Duffy was no greater than that 
occasioned to any person on the removal of an 
appendix and not much, if any, more serious than 
an ordinary tonsilectomy." 
Of course, Duffy did not experience the intensified 
and concentrated mental suffering endured by plaintiff 
here. Also plaintiff worried about his eye sight for ap-
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proximately eleven months to the time of trial and only 
the week before had been bothered by a particle coming 
from his eye. vV e submit that the damages here are 
greater than those in the Duffy c.ase. Wheat v. Denver 
& Rio Grande Western R. Co., (Utah) 250 P. 2d 932, 
characterized the holding in the Duffy case as follows: 
"Accurately analyzed, the view of the court 
in the above cases was undoubtedly that the 
award, while excessive, was not so grossly excess-
ive as to taint and make invalid the whole ver-
dict.'' 
Even in the case mainly relied on by defendant the 
Court found the verdict was not tainted with passion or 
prejudice. 
The rule is stated in the vVheat case as follows: 
"We do not doubt that when a verdict is so 
grossly disproportionate to any amount of dam-
ages which could have fairly been awarded as 
to make manifest that the verdict was so suffused 
with passion and prejudice that the defendant 
could not have had a fair trial on the issues, the 
trial court should unconditionally grant a new 
trial. * * * X otwithstanding what was said therein, 
we regard the true rule to be that if the verdict 
is so excessive as to show that it 1nust have been 
motivated by prejudice or ill will toward a liti-
gant, or that passion such as anger, resentment, 
indignation or some kindred emotion has so over-
cOine or distorted the jury's re·ason that the ver-
dict is vindictive, vengeful or punitive, it should 
be unconditionally set aside." 
Defendant also relies on this 'Yheat case and makes 
eomparison of the injuries of Wheat and of plaintiff. 
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Again the injuries are entirely dissimilar and cannot 
even be weighed on the same scales. Another proposi-
tion to be considered is the fact that the same trial judge 
sat in both the Wheat and this case. He had the oppor-
tunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses and plaintiff. 
The Wheat case was cited to him on the argument for a 
new trial. In his judg1nent the money value of the dam-
.ages sustained by plaintiff was greater than Wheat's. 
Then, too, in the Wheat case there was a charge made 
that members of the jury were guilty of misconduct and 
the Court may well have remitted to eliminate any impli-
cation of prejudice. 
Comparison of verdicts gives little if any assistance. 
The verdicls of necessity include different people, places, 
dates, juries, courts, etc. 
The courts have found no rule of thumb or mathe-
matical formula with which to compute damages for 
mental or physical pain. It of necessity must be left to 
the sound discretion of the jury. The rule is stated in 
15 Am. J ur. 621, Damages section 205: 
"In actions sounding in damages merely, 
where the law furnishes no legal rule for measur-
ing them, the amount to be awarded rests largely 
in the discretion of the jury, and with their ver-
dict the courts are reluctant to interfere." 
The authorities generally do not segregate the mat-
ter of pain and suffering in discussing general verdict 
figures, but in cases under the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act, courts have had occasion to review verdicts 
containing specified amounts for pain and suffering in 
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actions for wrongful death. In N oce v. St. Louis-San 
Francisco Ry. Co., 337 Mo. 689, 85 S.W. (2d) 637, an 
aw.ard of $10,000 for three hours conscious pain and 
suffering was held not to be excessive. Here the deceased 
had been hit in the head by a "metal hub liner" which 
had been thrown off a wheel of a railroad car. In Tal-
bert v. Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co., 321 Mo. 1030, 15 S.W. 
(2d) 762 (cer. den. 280 U.S. 567, 74 L. Ed. 621, 50S. Ct. 
26) an award of $10,000.00 for one hour of pain and suf-
fering was upheld. The legs and hips of the deceased 
had been crushed. In St. Louis I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Croft, 
237 U.S. 648, 59 L. Ed. 1160, 35 S. Ct. 704, $5,000.00 for 
one-half hour of pain was upheld. In Stone v. Sinclair 
Refining Co., 230 !Ech. 472, 202 N.\V. 1004, .a $4,000.00 
award was upheld for four hours pain. In Payne v. 
Shipler, 243 S.W. 538, the deceased lived seventeen hours 
after the injury, $5,000.00 for pain endured \Yas awarded 
and the award was upheld. 
The deduction for contributory negligence is an-
other item which here refutes the clailn of passion and 
prejudice. The theory of defendant's contention is that 
the jury was so i1npassioned either for plaintiff or against 
defendant that it wanted to giYe plaintiff more than he 
was entitled to. If this is so why would the jury reduce 
the verdict in favor of defendant? This certainly is not 
the .act of an unreasoning group of persons acting solely 
frmn pa~~ion and prejudice. This should dispell any 
thought that this was the n1otivating factor in rendering 
the verdict. 
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\V e submit that the verdict is not tainted with pas-
sion and prejudice and that a reversal and new trial 
should not be awarded to defendant. This Court should 
be able to look at this verdict and remain unshocked and 
unshaken. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION 
IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS THA'T THE VERDICT 
OF THE JURY WAS EXCESSIVE DUE TO THE INFLUENCE 
OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE. 
As indicated by the .authorities cited above and by 
defendant the review by an appellate court of claimed 
excessive damages is a limited one. The appellate court's 
sole function is to determine whether the trial court has 
abused its discretion in denying, in this case, defendant's 
motion for .a new trial. This Court must find that the 
trial court acted capriciously and arbitrarily in such 
denial. 
\V e submit that under the evidence mentioned and 
the authorities cited in Point I there was no abuse of dis-
cretion by the trial court. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION 
IN FAILING TO ORDER PLAINTIFF TO MAKE A RE-
MITTITUR. 
Under its Point III defendant suggests a reduction 
of the verdict in the event the Court does not go for the 
passion and prejudice point. 
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We do not contend against the power of the Court 
to reduce the verdict. It is settled law that it has such 
power and this power it has exercised. But the question 
is should it be exercised in a case like this one~ To what 
figure should it be reduced and upon what basis will the 
Court arrive at a figure~ Will it not be usurping the 
functions of the jury and trial court~ 
Admitting the verdict is liberal that is not enough 
to justify the Court in reducing it. The jury has voiced 
its opinion. This Court should not merely set up its 
opinion against that of the jury. Counsel for defendant J 
has not had the hardihood to suggest a figure to which 
the verdict should be reduced and give his reasons and 
basis for it. 
Again we must call attention to. the evidence and 
authorities set forth under Point I and submit that the 
verdict is not excessive and it should not be disturbed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
Counsel for Respondent 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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